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FALSE SPEECH AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY*
False speech—what today is called “fake news”—is nothing new.
Throughout this country’s history, issues concerning false speech have
arisen. Early in American history, Congress, with many of the
Constitution’s drafters and ratifiers participating, adopted the Alien and
Sedition Acts of 1798.1 The law prohibited the publication of
false, scandalous and malicious writing or writings against the
government of the United States, or either house of the Congress
of the United States, or the President of the United States, with
intent to defame . . . or to bring them . . . into contempt or
disrepute; or to excite against them . . . hatred of the good people
of the United States, or to stir up sedition within the United
States, or to excite any unlawful combinations therein, for
opposing or resisting any law of the United States, or any act of
the President of the United States.2
The law was all about dealing with what was regarded as false speech.
The Federalists under President John Adams aggressively used the law
against their rivals, the Republicans.3 The Alien and Sedition Acts were a
major political issue in the election of 1800, and after he was elected
President, Thomas Jefferson pardoned those who had been convicted under
the law.4 The Alien and Sedition Acts were repealed, and the Supreme
* Dean and Jesse H. Choper Distinguished Professor of Law, University of California,
Berkeley School of Law.
1. Ch. 74, 1 Stat. 596 (1798).
2. Id.
3. See Michael P. Downey, Note, The Jeffersonian Myth in Supreme Court Sedition
Jurisprudence, 76 WASH. U. L.Q. 683, 692 (1998).
4. Id. at 694.
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Court never ruled on their constitutionality.5 In New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, however, the Court declared, “Although the Sedition Act was
never tested in this Court, the attack upon its validity has carried the day in
the court of history.”6
Exactly a century later, the nation was focused on “yellow journalism.”7
The term was used especially in the mid-1890s to characterize the
sensational journalism that used some yellow ink in the circulation war
between Joseph Pulitzer’s New York World and William Randolph
Hearst’s New York Journal.8 Yellow journalism was characterized by
“prominent headlines that ‘screamed excitement,’ . . . ‘lavish use of
pictures,’ . . . ‘frauds of various kinds,’ . . . Sunday supplement and color
comics, . . . [and] ‘campaigns against abuses suffered by the common
people.’”9 One of the most famous law review articles in history—Warren
and Brandeis on the right to privacy—was written in response to the
journalistic practices of that time.10 They decried the yellow journalists and
gossip-mongers and criticized a sensational press that increasingly ignored
the “obvious bounds of propriety and of decency.”11
Again now, early in the twenty-first century, there is a focus on false
speech. The phrase “fake news” has become part of the vernacular. Is this
just a continuation of an issue that has been part of American history since
its earliest days, or is it somehow different? In this Essay I want to suggest
that the internet has made the issue different from times past and will raise
difficult issues of First Amendment law. Specifically, in this Essay I make
three points. First, the internet has significantly changed the nature of free
speech, including the problem of false speech. Second, there is no overall
principle as to how false speech is treated under the First Amendment, and
there never will be such a principle. And third, the problem of false speech
from foreign governments and foreign actors that emerged as a result of the
2016 presidential election poses special difficulties under the First
Amendment.

5. Id.
6. 376 U.S. 254, 276 (1964).
7. Lawrence M. Friedman, Name Robbers: Privacy, Blackmail, and Assorted Matters
in Legal History, 30 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1093, 1114–15 (2002) (discussing yellow journalism).
8. W. JOSEPH CAMPBELL, YELLOW JOURNALISM: PUNCTURING THE MYTHS, DEFINING
THE LEGACIES 25 (2001) (describing nineteenth-century reporting practices).
9. Id. at 7.
10. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193
(1890).
11. Id. at 196.
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My goal in this Essay is more to identify issues concerning false speech
than to offer solutions. It is important to recognize both how the problems
are different than those that have been confronted before and the challenges
these new problems pose under the First Amendment.
I. The Internet as a Unique Medium for Communication
The internet is the most important medium for communication to be
developed since the printing press. In Packingham v. North Carolina,
decided in June 2017, the Supreme Court spoke forcefully about the
importance of the internet and social media as a place for speech.12 The
Court declared unconstitutional a North Carolina law that prohibited
registered sex offenders from using interactive social media where minors
might be present.13 The Court explained that cyberspace, and social media
in particular, are vitally important places for speech.14 Justice Kennedy,
writing for the majority, explained:
Seven in ten American adults use at least one Internet social
networking service. . . . According to sources cited to the Court
in this case, Facebook has 1.79 billion active users. This is about
three times the population of North America.
Social media offers “relatively unlimited, low-cost capacity
for communication of all kinds.” On Facebook, for example,
users can debate religion and politics with their friends and
neighbors or share vacation photos. On LinkedIn, users can look
for work, advertise for employees, or review tips on
entrepreneurship. And on Twitter, users can petition their elected
representatives and otherwise engage with them in a direct
manner. Indeed, Governors in all 50 States and almost every
Member of Congress have set up accounts for this purpose. In
short, social media users employ these websites to engage in a
wide array of protected First Amendment activity on topics “as
diverse as human thought.” . . .
. . . While we now may be coming to the realization that the
Cyber Age is a revolution of historic proportions, we cannot
appreciate yet its full dimensions and vast potential to alter how
we think, express ourselves, and define who we want to be. The
12. 137 S. Ct. 1730 (2017).
13. Id. at 1733.
14. Id. at 1735.
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forces and directions of the Internet are so new, so protean, and
so far reaching that courts must be conscious that what they say
today might be obsolete tomorrow.15
Three characteristics of the internet are particularly important, especially
for the problem of false speech. First, the internet has democratized the
ability to reach a mass audience. It used to be that to reach a large audience,
a person had to be rich enough to own a newspaper or to get a broadcast
license. Now, though, anyone with a smart phone—or even just access to a
library where there is a modem—can reach a huge audience
instantaneously. There are great benefits to this, but also costs. No longer
are people dependent on a relatively small number of sources for news.
A half century ago, the Court unanimously held that the federal
government could regulate the broadcast media because of the inherent
scarcity of spectrum space.16 No longer is there such scarcity. The internet
also means that false information can be quickly spread by an almost
infinite number of sources. True information that is private can be quickly
disseminated.17 There is even a name for it: “Doxing,” or publishing private
information about a person on the internet, often with the malicious intent
to harm the individual.18 The internet and social media can be used to
harass.19 A study by the Pew Research Center “found 40 percent of adult
Internet users have experienced harassment online, with young women
enduring particularly severe forms of it.”20
Second, the internet has dramatically increased the dissemination and
permanence of information, or to phrase this differently, it has enormously
increased the ability to access information. Take defamation as an example.
Imagine before the internet that a local newspaper published false
information about a person that harmed his or her reputation. The falsity
would be known by readers of the paper and could be circulated by word of
mouth. There could be great harm to the person’s reputation. But the
newspaper itself would largely disappear except to those wanting to search
15. Id. at 1735–36 (citations omitted).
16. Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 375 (1969) (upholding the fairness
doctrine based on broadcast spectrum scarcity).
17. See LORI ANDREWS, I KNOW WHO YOU ARE AND I SAW WHAT YOU DID: SOCIAL
NETWORKS AND THE DEATH OF PRIVACY 121–35 (2011).
18. DANIELLE KEATS CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE 53 (2014).
19. Id. at 35–55.
20. Marlisse Silver Sweeney, What the Law Can (and Can’t) Do About Online
Harassment, ATLANTIC (Nov. 12, 2014), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/
2014/11/what-the-law-can-and-cant-do-about-online-harassment/382638/.
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for it on microfilm or microfiche. Accessing the actual story would be very
difficult.
Now, though, the defamatory story can be quickly spread across the
internet and likely will be there to be found forever. It is enormously
difficult, if not impossible, to erase something from the internet. The
internet has the benefit of providing us all great access to information. As
lawyers and law students, we can access Westlaw and all of the cases and
secondary sources that would have required a trip to the law library when I
was in law school. We can visit the great museums of the world online. We
have access to unlimited information from a myriad of sources. But it also
means that false information can be easily accessed and remains available
in a way that was impossible before the internet.
Finally, the internet does not respect national boundaries. Again, there
are great benefits to this. Totalitarian governments cannot cut off
information to their citizens. When the revolution began in Egypt, the
government tried to stop access to the internet, but people with satellite
phones could maintain access and, consequently, disseminate what they
learned.21 The Supreme Court has estimated that forty percent of
pornography on the internet comes from foreign countries, making any
attempt to control it within a country impossible.22 Of course, as we saw in
the 2016 presidential election and evidenced by Special Counsel Robert
Mueller’s indictments, this also allows foreign countries and foreign actors
a vehicle for trying to influence the outcome of United States elections.23
This, of course, is just a brief sketch of how the internet has changed free
speech. But my point, like the Court’s in Packingham, is that the internet is
different from other media that exist for speech. The benefits are great, but
so too are the potential costs, especially when it comes to false speech. It is
easier to disseminate, easier to retrieve, and easier for those in foreign
countries to send it to be read by those in the United States.
II. The Lack of a Consistent First Amendment Approach to False Speech
There is no consistent answer as to whether false speech is protected by
the First Amendment. In some areas, the Court has found constitutional
protection for false expression, but in other instances it has upheld the
ability of the government to punish false speech. After reviewing some of
21. When Egypt Turned Off the Internet, AL JAZEERA (Jan. 28, 2011), https://www.
aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2011/01/2011128796164380.html.
22. Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 667 (2004).
23. See infra Part III.
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these cases, I argue that this is inevitable because analysis must be
contextual and must be the result of balancing of competing interests, which
will prevent a consistent approach to false speech. That is, the Court never
will be able to say that all false speech is outside of First Amendment
protection or that all false speech is constitutionally safeguarded.
In some instances, the Court has emphatically declared the importance of
protecting false speech. The most important case in this regard—and one of
the most important free speech decisions of all time—is New York Times
Co. v. Sullivan.24 L.B. Sullivan, an elected commissioner of Montgomery,
Alabama, sued the New York Times and four African-American clergymen
for an advertisement that had been published in the newspaper on March
29, 1960.25 The ad criticized the way in which police in Montgomery had
mistreated civil rights demonstrators.26 There is no dispute that the ad
contained false statements: It said that the demonstrators sang “My Country
‘Tis of Thee,” but they actually sang the national anthem; it said that Dr.
Martin Luther King, Jr., had been arrested seven times, but it really was
only four; it said that nine students were expelled for the demonstration, but
their suspension was for a different protest at lunch counters; and the ad
mistakenly said that the dining hall had been padlocked.27 Pursuant to a
judge’s instructions that the statements were libelous per se and that general
damages could be presumed, the jury awarded a $500,000 verdict for
Sullivan.28
The Supreme Court held that the tort liability violated the First
Amendment.29 Justice Brennan, writing for the Court, began by stating that
the case was considered “against the background of a profound national
commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be
uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it may well include vehement,
caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and
public officials.”30 The Court explained that criticism of government and
government officials was at the core of speech protected by the First
Amendment.31 Most importantly, especially for this discussion, the Court
said that the fact that some of the statements were false was not sufficient to
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

376 U.S. 254 (1964).
Id. at 256.
Id. at 256–57.
Id. at 258–59.
Id. at 256, 262.
Id. at 283.
Id. at 270.
Id. at 273.
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deny the speech First Amendment protection.32 The Court explained that
false “statement is inevitable in free debate and [it] must be protected if the
freedoms of expression are to have the ‘breathing space’ that they ‘need . . .
to survive.’”33
Accordingly, the Court said that it was not enough that truth was a
defense under Alabama’s libel law—requiring that defendants prove the
truth of their statements will chill speech.34 The Court thus concluded that
the First Amendment prevents a “public official from recovering damages
for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves
that the statement was made with ‘actual malice’—that is, with knowledge
that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.”35
New York Times is widely regarded as one of the most important First
Amendment decisions in history because of its application of the
Constitution as a limit on tort liability, because of its strong protection of
political speech, and because of its protection of even false speech.36
More recently, in a very different context, in United States v. Alvarez, the
Court again recognized the importance of judicial protection of false
speech.37 Alvarez involved the constitutionality of a federal law that made it
a crime for a person to falsely claim to have received military honors or
decorations.38 Justice Kennedy wrote for a plurality of four and concluded
that the law imposed a content-based restriction on speech and thus had to
meet the most “exacting scrutiny.”39 He explained that the government
failed this test because it did not prove any harm from false claims of
military honors and because the government could achieve its goals through
less restrictive alternatives.40

32. Id. at 271.
33. Id. at 271–72.
34. Id. at 278–79.
35. Id. at 279–80.
36. See, e.g., Harry Kalven Jr., The New York Times Case: A Note on “The Central
Meaning of the First Amendment,” 1964 SUP. CT. REV. 191, 221 n.125 (describing New York
Times v. Sullivan as the occasion for “dancing in the streets”).
37. 567 U.S. 709 (2012).
38. Id. at 715–16.
39. Id. at 715.
40. Id. at 725–26.
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Most importantly, Justice Kennedy expressly rejected the government’s
argument that false speech is inherently outside the scope of the First
Amendment.41 Justice Kennedy declared:
Absent from those few categories where the law allows contentbased regulation of speech is any general exception to the First
Amendment for false statements. This comports with the
common understanding that some false statements are inevitable
if there is to be an open and vigorous expression of views in
public and private conversation, expression the First Amendment
seeks to guarantee.42
Justice Kennedy further explained: “Even when considering some instances
of defamation and fraud, moreover, the Court has been careful to instruct
that falsity alone may not suffice to bring the speech outside the First
Amendment.”43
Most recently, in Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, the Court
considered a challenge to an Ohio law that criminalized making false
statements about candidates during political campaigns.44 The Susan B.
Anthony List, a political group that previously had been threatened with
prosecution under the law, brought a suit for a declaratory judgment to have
the law declared unconstitutional.45 Although the Court did not reach the
merits as to whether Ohio’s law violated the First Amendment,46 the Court
recognized the harms of such a prohibition of speech and noted “[t]he
burdens that Commission proceedings can impose on electoral speech are
of particular concern here.”47 It is hard to imagine the Supreme Court
upholding a state law like Ohio’s that prohibits false statements in election
campaigns.48
41. Justice Breyer concurred in the judgment, joined by Justice Kagan. He said that he
would use intermediate rather than strict scrutiny and that the law failed this test because it
was not narrowly tailored. Id. at 731 (Breyer, J., concurring).
42. Id. at 718.
43. Id. at 719.
44. 134 S. Ct. 2334, 2338 (2014).
45. Id. at 2339.
46. The Court found that the plaintiffs met the standing requirements of Article III
because they alleged a credible threat of enforcement and remanded the case on those
grounds. Id. at 2343, 2347.
47. Id. at 2346.
48. On remand, the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio found
the law to be an unconstitutional restriction of protected speech; the decision was then
affirmed by the Sixth Circuit. Susan B. Anthony List v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 45 F.

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol71/iss1/2

2018]

FALSE SPEECH AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT

9

Yet there are other contexts in which the Supreme Court has refused to
provide protection for false speech. For example, it is clearly established
that false and deceptive advertisements are unprotected by the First
Amendment.49 The Court frequently has declared that only truthful
commercial speech is constitutionally protected.50 Of course, the law is
clear that the government can constitutionally prohibit making false
statements under oath (perjury) or to law enforcement officials.51 The First
Amendment is no defense to such charges. More generally, the Court has
declared that “[f]alse statements of fact are particularly valueless [because]
they interfere with the truth-seeking function of the marketplace of ideas,”52
and that false statements “are not protected by the First Amendment in the
same manner as truthful statements.”53 Indeed, the Court has declared
that “the knowingly false statement and the false statement made with
reckless disregard of the truth, do not enjoy constitutional protection.”54
The Court’s seemingly inconsistent statements about false speech can be
understood as reflecting the competing interests inherent in First
Amendment analysis. On the one hand, false speech can create harms, even
great harms. Speech is protected especially because of its importance for
the democratic process, but false speech can distort that process. Speech is
safeguarded, too, because of the belief that the marketplace of ideas is the
best way for truth to emerge. But false speech can infect that marketplace
and there is no reason to believe that truth will triumph. False speech can
hurt reputation, and it is fanciful to think that more speech necessarily can
undo the harms.
But at the same time, there is great concern about allowing the
government to prohibit and punish false speech. New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan was unquestionably correct when it said that that false “statement
is inevitable in free debate, and . . . it must be protected if the freedoms of
expression are to have the ‘breathing space’ that they ‘need * * * to
survive.’”55
Supp. 3d 765, 775–79 (S.D. Ohio 2014), aff’d sub nom., Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus,
814 F.3d 466, 476 (6th Cir. 2016).
49. See, e.g., Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S.
557, 563 (1980).
50. Id. at 566.
51. United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 720 (2012).
52. Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 52 (1988).
53. Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 60–61 (1982).
54. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 75 (1964).
55. 376 U.S. 254, 271–72 (1964) (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433
(1963)).

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2018

10

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 71:1

Also, allowing the government to prohibit false speech places it in the
role of being the arbiter of truth. Justice Kennedy captured the dangers of
this in Alvarez:
Permitting the government to decree this speech to be a criminal
offense, whether shouted from the rooftops or made in a barely
audible whisper, would endorse government authority to compile
a list of subjects about which false statements are punishable.
That governmental power has no clear limiting principle. Our
constitutional tradition stands against the idea that we need
Oceania’s Ministry of Truth.56
The result is that it always will be impossible to say either that false
speech is always protected by the First Amendment or that it never is
protected by the First Amendment. Inescapably, the Court will need to
balance the benefits of protecting the false speech against the costs of doing
so. Such balancing is inherently contextual and will yield no general answer
as to the Constitution’s protection of false speech.
III. Foreign Speech
There is now incontrovertible evidence that Russia engaged in a
concerted effort to use speech, including false speech, to influence the
outcome of the 2016 presidential election.57 American intelligence agencies
recognized this soon after the election.58 In February 2018, Special Counsel
Robert Mueller issued a thirty-seven page indictment charging thirteen
Russians and three companies with executing a scheme to subvert the 2016
election and help to elect Donald Trump as President.59 Mueller’s
indictment details “how the Russians repeatedly turned to Facebook and
Instagram, often using stolen identities to pose as Americans, to sow
discord among the electorate by creating Facebook groups, distributing

56. 567 U.S. at 723.
57. See, e.g., Office of the Dir. of Nat’l Intelligence, Assessing Russian Activities and
Intentions in Recent US Elections, DIR. OF NAT’L INTELLIGENCE (Jan. 6, 2017), https://www.
dni.gov/files/documents/ICA_2017_01.pdf.
58. Id.
59. Indictment, United States v. Internet Research Agency LLC, No. 1:18-cr-00032DLF (D.D.C. Feb. 16, 2018), 2018 WL 914777; Kara Scannell et al., Mueller Indicts 13
Russian Nationals over 2016 Election Interference, CNN (Feb. 17, 2018), https://www.
cnn.com/2018/02/16/politics/mueller-russia-indictments-election-interference/index.html.
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divisive ads and posting inflammatory images.”60 Russia’s efforts to
influence the election primarily were through the internet and social media.
There is understandable widespread outrage at the idea of Russia
engaging in a concerted effort to influence the outcome of the 2016
presidential election. Yet, it must be remembered that the United States
long has been doing exactly this, using speech—including false speech—to
try and influence the outcome of elections in foreign countries. Dov Levin,
a professor at Carnegie Mellon University, identified eighty-one instances
between 1946 and 2000 in which the United States did this.61 As one report
explained,
Bags of cash delivered to a Rome hotel for favored Italian
candidates. Scandalous stories leaked to foreign newspapers to
swing an election in Nicaragua. Millions of pamphlets, posters
and stickers printed to defeat an incumbent in Serbia. The long
arm of Vladimir Putin? No, just a small sample of the United
States’ history of intervention in foreign elections.62
Although condemnation of Russian meddling in the American election is
easy, the underlying First Amendment issue is difficult. Obviously illegal
conduct, such as hacking into the Democratic National Committee
headquarters and subsequently disseminating the unlawfully gained
information,63 is not constitutionally protected. But what about foreign
speech that is legal and that expresses an opinion—even false speech?
The Supreme Court repeatedly has said that the source of information
does not matter for First Amendment purposes. In First National Bank of
Boston v. Bellotti, the Supreme Court declared unconstitutional a
Massachusetts law that prohibited banks or businesses from making
contributions or expenditures in connection with ballot initiatives and
referenda.64 Justice Powell, writing for the Court, concluded that the value
of speech is in informing the audience. Any restriction on speech,

60. Sheera Frenkel & Katie Benner, To Stir Discord in 2016, Russians Turned Most
Often to Facebook, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 17, 2018), http://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/17/
technology/indictment-russians-tech-facebook.html.
61. Scott Shane, Russia Isn’t the Only One Meddling in Elections. We Do It Too, N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 17, 2018), http://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/17/sunday-review/russia-isnt-theonly-one-meddling-in-elections-we-do-it-too.html.
62. Id.
63. Raphael Satter, Inside Story: How Russians Hacked the Democrats’ Emails, AP
(Nov. 4, 2017), https://www.apnews.com/dea73efc01594839957c3c9a6c962b8a.
64. 435 U.S. 765, 767–68 (1978).
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regardless of its source, therefore undermines the First Amendment. Justice
Powell explained:
The speech proposed by appellants is at the heart of the First
Amendment’s protection. . . . If the speakers here were not
corporations, no one would suggest that the State could silence
their proposed speech. It is the type of speech indispensable to
decisionmaking in a democracy, and this is no less true because
the speech comes from a corporation rather than an individual.
The inherent worth of the speech in terms of its capacity for
informing the public does not depend upon the identity of its
source, whether corporation, association, union, or individual.65
The Court relied on this in Citizens United v. Federal Election
Commission to hold that corporations have the constitutional right to spend
unlimited amounts of money directly from their treasuries to elect or defeat
candidates for political office.66 The Court stressed that the value of the
speech does not depend on the identity of the speaker and held that
corporate speech is protected not because of the inherent rights of
corporations, but because all expression contributes to the marketplace of
ideas. The Court wrote:
The rule that political speech cannot be limited based on a
speaker’s wealth is a necessary consequence of the premise that
the First Amendment generally prohibits the suppression of
political speech based on the speaker’s identity. . . . The basic
premise underlying the Court’s ruling is its iteration, and
constant reiteration, of the proposition that the First Amendment
bars regulatory distinctions based on a speaker’s identity,
including its ‘identity’ as a corporation.67
On other occasions, too, the Court has declared that “[t]he identity of the
speaker is not decisive in determining whether speech is protected.”68
But if this is so, why should it matter whether the speaker is a foreign
government or foreign individual? Federal law prohibits foreign
governments, individuals, and corporations from contributing money to

65. Id. at 776–77 (emphasis added).
66. 558 U.S. 310, 319 (2010).
67. Id. at 350, 394.
68. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n of Cal., 475 U.S. 1, 8 (1986) (plurality
opinion).
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candidates for federal office.69 A federal court upheld this restriction on
foreign speech, declaring:
It is fundamental to the definition of our national political
community that foreign citizens do not have a constitutional
right to participate in, and thus may be excluded from, activities
of democratic self-government. It follows, therefore, that the
United States has a compelling interest for purposes of First
Amendment analysis in limiting the participation of foreign
citizens in activities of American democratic self-government,
and in thereby preventing foreign influence over the U.S.
political process.70
But can this be reconciled with the Supreme Court’s declaration that the
identity of the speaker should not matter in First Amendment analysis? It is
notable that the Court in Bluman focused just on campaign contributions
and expenditures, declining to decide “whether Congress could prohibit
foreign nationals from engaging in speech other than contributions to
candidates and parties, express-advocacy expenditures, and donations to
outside groups to be used for contributions to candidates and parties and
express-advocacy expenditures.”71
At the very least, it would be desirable to have disclosure of the identity
of speakers so that people can know when the speech is coming from a
foreign government or other foreign source. But this, too, raises First
Amendment issues as the Supreme Court has held that there is a First
Amendment right to speak anonymously. In Mclntyre v. Ohio Elections
Commission, the Court declared unconstitutional a law that prohibited the
distribution of anonymous campaign literature.72 Justice Stevens, writing
for the Court, stated:

69. Federal law
bar[s] foreign nationals—that is, all foreign citizens except those who have
been admitted as lawful permanent residents of the United States—from
contributing to candidates or political parties; from making expenditures to
expressly advocate the election or defeat of a political candidate; and from
making donations to outside groups when those donations in turn would be
used to make contributions to candidates or parties or to finance expressadvocacy expenditures.
Bluman v. FCC, 800 F. Supp. 2d 281, 284 (D.D.C. 2011), aff’d, 565 U.S. 1104 (2012).
70. Id. at 288.
71. Id. at 292.
72. 514 U.S. 334, 357 (1995).
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The decision in favor of anonymity may be motivated by fear of
economic or official retaliation, by concern about social
ostracism, or merely by a desire to preserve as much of one’s
privacy as possible. . . . Accordingly, an author’s decision to
remain anonymous, like other decisions concerning omissions or
additions to the content of a publication, is an aspect of the
freedom of speech protected by the First Amendment.73
Moreover, Justice Stevens said that anonymity also provides a way for a
speaker “who may be personally unpopular to ensure that readers will not
prejudge her message simply because they do not like its proponent.”74
Wouldn’t that be especially true of a foreign government or foreign
individuals who were trying to influence an American election?
I also worry that the internet may make all of this First Amendment and
legal analysis irrelevant. As the 2016 presidential election shows, foreign
governments can use the internet and social media to influence elections.
They can do so without their officials and agents ever entering the United
States. It is unclear how the law can be applied to them. The internet gives
them the ability to engage in false speech (and all other kinds of expression)
with relatively little fear of legal sanctions.
Conclusion
Ultimately the question underlying this symposium is the question of
whether there can be too much speech. The premise of the First
Amendment, and especially court decisions interpreting it, is that more
speech is inherently better. But if it is false speech, that assumption seems
dubious. Speech is protected as a fundamental right because it has effects.
But how should we think about it when the impact is harmful, such as with
false speech?
I also worry at how the internet and the ease with which it allows speech
may be increasing the polarization within the United States. I believe that
such polarization is the greatest threat to American democracy. In the
twentieth century, the media played an enormous unifying function. People
across the country watched the same movies, listened to the same radio
programs, and saw the same television programs. Everywhere in the United
States people got their news from Walter Cronkite or Huntley and Brinkley.
This helped bring together a nation with enormous regional differences. But
73. Id. at 341–42.
74. Id. at 342.
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now, because of the internet, people see news that not only reinforces their
beliefs but also—pointedly and purposefully—emphasizes our differences.
The media is dividing, not unifying us as a nation.
Like so much in this Essay, I do not have a solution. I still believe in the
premise of the First Amendment—that more speech is better. But ever
more, I realize that it is a matter of faith, and the internet may challenge that
faith for all of us.
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